To Motivate Social Grouping in Wireless Networks by Hsu, Yu-Pin & Duan, Lingjie
ar
X
iv
:1
51
1.
01
79
5v
2 
 [c
s.S
I] 
 21
 Ju
n 2
01
6
1
To Motivate Social Grouping in Wireless Networks
Yu-Pin Hsu∗ and Lingjie Duan†
∗Laboratory for Information and Decision Systems, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
†Engineering Systems and Design Pillar, Singapore University of Technology and Design
yupinhsu@mit.edu, lingjie duan@sutd.edu.sg
Abstract
We consider a group of neighboring smartphone users who are roughly at the same time interested
in the same network content, called common interests. However, ever-increasing data traffic challenges
the limited capacity of base-stations (BSs) in wireless networks. To better utilize the limited BSs’
resources under unreliable wireless networks, we propose local common-interests sharing (enabled by
D2D communications) by motivating the physically neighboring users to form a social group. As users
are selfish in practice, an incentive mechanism is needed to motivate social grouping. We propose a
novel concept of equal-reciprocal incentive over broadcast communications, which fairly ensures that
each pair of the users in the social group share the same amount of content with each other. As the
equal-reciprocal incentive may restrict the amount of content shared among the users, we analyze the
optimal equal-reciprocal scheme that maximizes local sharing content. While ensuring fairness among
users, we show that this optimized scheme also maximizes each user’s utility in the social group. Finally,
we look at dynamic content arrivals and extend our scheme successfully by proposing novel on-line
scheduling algorithms.
I. INTRODUCTION
Billions of people around the globe rely on wireless devices for conferencing, streaming, and
file downloading. Unfortunately, wireless networks are inherently less reliable than wired net-
works. Moreover, the limited usable spectrum of base-stations (BSs) poses significant challenges
to network designers. In this paper, we are addressing the key issues of unreliability and limited
resource in wireless networks by leveraging the broadcast nature of wireless communications.
To that end, we first notice that video traffic will increase to 72% of the total traffic by
2020 [1]. Moreover, it becomes more and more popular that people watch videos on their own
smartphones or personal devices individually. A group of friends would be watching live sport-
games (like football or soccer) or TV programs together, such as at a bar, a camping site, or a
bus. In fact, half of males, aged 18-34, look at videos with friends in person according to [2].
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Fig. 1. Co-existence of broadcast BS-to-device (B2D) and broadcast device-to-device (D2D) communications. Users c1, c2, c3
are simultaneously interested in the same streaming.
In particular, we are motivated by the MicroCast system, recently proposed and implemented as
an Android application (e.g., see [3–5]). In the MicroCast scenario, a small group of smartphone
users within the proximity of each other are almost at the same time interested in the same
content. We refer to the same content for different users as common interests. We remark that
due to growing attention of social networks [6], which exhibit homophily by sharing common
interests and similar behaviors, a Google patent [7] defines a device-to-device (D2D) service
type that finds people who share common interests.
Traditionally users communicate with BSs via their cellular links independently, i.e., the BSs
unicast streaming to the users. Ideally, if the channels are noiseless, identifying the common
interests of the users can save the time to deliver the common interests by leveraging the
broadcast BS-to-device (B2D) medium. However, because of unreliable wireless channels, we
first show that the broadcast B2D (i.e., identifying the common interests) is not that effective
unless the local users are willing to share the common interests together.
Due to the emerging broadcast D2D technology, neighboring users that are physically close
can communicate with each other. Through local content sharing over D2D communications,
the BSs’ bandwidth can be saved. For example, if a user in Fig. 1 loses content from the BS’s
broadcast, the user can still obtain it from other users via D2D sharing. We consider hybrid
networks including both the broadcast B2D and broadcast D2D communication technologies,
as shown in Fig. 1. In other words, we are leveraging both femto-caching [8] and D2D-caching
[9], where the femto-caches in BSs store common interests for users, while some information
can be stored in D2D-chases of local users for possible future sharing.
However, the users are selfish in general; as such, we cannot expect that the selfish users
are willing to share their own resources. To facilitate D2D communications by building up a
3social relationship, there is a critical need to design an incentive mechanism that provides the
neighboring users with a motivation to form a social group. Moreover, the users would appreciate
a free and simple sharing service without complex money exchanges.
Hence, we propose a novel non-monentary incentive concept, which is referred to as equal-
reciprocal scheme. Applying the equal-reciprocal incentive over the broadcast hybrid networks,
the BS impartially requests each pair of the users in the social group to share the same amount
of content with each other.
Considering users’ heterogeneous B2D channels, as the equal-reciprocal incentive may limit
the amount of content the users are willing to share, more questions arise in order to optimize
network performance (e.g., throughput or delays): (1) Which users should share their resource?
(2) How much content should the users share with others? We will answer the questions by
analyzing the optimal equal-reciprocal scheme that optimizes network performance.
Furthermore, we show that the BS and the local users have a win-win situation by using the
proposed optimal equal-reciprocal scheme. The optimal equal-reciprocal scheme minimizes the
expected time to deliver the common interests to all users, and at the same time it maximizes
a utility of each user in the group, where the utility is the difference between the amount of
content uploaded from this user and those downloaded from the social group. In other words,
we are simultaneously solving both global and local optimization problems. Hence, in addition
to the fairness resulted from the equal-reciprocal idea, the optimal equal-reciprocal scheme also
maximizes each user’s utility.
Finally, we propose on-line scheduling algorithms, including both optimal centralized and
sub-optimal distributed algorithms (easy to implement) to address a more general case of dy-
namic content arrivals. The algorithms adaptively select a user to share received content in a
timely fashion. We will analyze the proposed algorithms from both theoretical and numerical
perspectives.
A. Related work
In this paper, we focus on motivating social grouping over the hybrid networks. We explore
several related research directions as follows.
1) Local repair on multicast: As our network scenarios have the notion of cooperatively
recovering lost content, we first compare our work with local repair schemes for the multicast
routing (e.g., MAODV [10]). Lots of such local repair schemes are proposed to find a substitute
for a failure link; however, there is no notion of content sharing among a group of users. In
4this paper, we consider a group of neighboring users with a potential to share content, where an
incentive is required.
2) D2D networks: Recently, there is an increasing concern about D2D communications, e.g.,
see the survey papers [11, 12] and the references therein. Many work about D2D networks
ignores broadcast advantages (as also stated in [13]), while the most related work, which has
the notions of multicast, broadcast, or social group, is [3–5, 13–24].
A reliable D2D multicast notion is introduced in [14]. The authors in [15] analyze the
performance of D2D-assisted networks using stochastic geometry. In [16], a D2D network
is studied in terms of optimizing multicast by choosing the optimal multicast rate and the
optimal number of re-transmission times, while [17] proposes a social group utility maximization
framework. Moreover, there is some network coding design for D2D-assisted networks, e.g., [18–
22]. The work [3–5, 13–22] basically assumes neighboring users are always willing to help each
other.
We want to emphasize that we focus on the MicroCast scenario [3–5], in which a group
of smartphone users are interested in the same content simultaneously. Based on the scenario,
the paper [13] devices a real-time scheduling algorithm. On the contrary, we are designing and
analyzing an incentive mechanism for the MicroCast scenario, i.e., to motivate social grouping.
3) Incentive design for P2P/D2D networks: Traditional incentive schemes for P2P networks
(e.g., the tit-for-tat incentive [25] and [26–28]) are unicast-based, and do not take full advantage
of the broadcast feature of wireless networks. Of the most relevant literature about incentive
design for D2D networks (which uses social group or broadcast) is [23, 24]. They propose
incentive schemes based on a coalitional game and mean field game, respectively, while [23]
needs money transfers and the incentive mechanism in [24] is designed for a given social
relationship.
In contrast, we propose a non-monetary incentive scheme that simply leverages broadcast
D2D. We can view our proposed equal-reciprocal incentive as a generalization of the existing
tit-for-tat scheme for broadcast networks. Better exploiting the broadcast D2D, our scheme will
bring many more advantages beyond the tit-for-tat incentive; however, more challenges arise
because a broadcast packet will be received by all neighboring users in a group, so the users are
co-related with each other. Furthermore, we also consider heterogeneity of wireless channels as
well as dynamic content arrivals.
Despite the broadcast nature of wireless communications, few incentive design in D2D net-
works takes advantage of the broadcast medium. This work contributes to this emerging line of
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Fig. 2. Two users with a common interest.
research.
4) Network coding: Network coding can improve bandwidth usage in unreliable networks by
leveraging broadcast medium, e.g., random linear network coding [29]. However, we are address-
ing the similar issue from another perspective. We adopt a hybrid B2D and D2D architecture,
while focusing on how to promote D2D communications by incentivizing neighboring users to
construct a social relationship. We note that our scheme is compatible with network coding. In
other words, network performance can be further improved by using both network coding and
our scheme.
II. SYMMETRIC NETWORKS
We start with a simple network that includes a BS and two wireless users c1 and c2. The
BS has a common packet q (i.e., common interest) that needs to be delivered to c1 and c2,
respectively, as illustrated in Fig. 2. This simplified scenario allows us to deliver clear analytic
results and clean engineering insights. More general cases will be analyzed in the following
sections; in particular, we will investigate dynamic packet arrivals in Section IV.
We consider a discrete time system, in which the BS can transmit at most one packet in
each time slot. Transmissions between the BS and each users are unreliable, where each B2D
channel is describe as a time-varying ON/OFF channel1. By s(t) = (s1(t), s2(t)), we describe
the channel state vector at time t, where si(t) = 1 if the BS can successfully transmit a packet to
user ci at time t; otherwise, si(t) = 0. The channel state vector is assumed to be independent and
identically distributed (i.i.d.) over time. Moreover, we assume that the BS knows the channel
state s(t) before transmitting a packet at time t, which can be achieved by existing channel
1In this paper, we consider unreliable communications, i.e., either the BS does not use the rate-adaption to make error-free
transmissions, or non-trivial B2D errors still occur with the rate-adaption scheme. As in many other papers, e.g., [30, 31], our
first focus is on the i.i.d. ON/OFF model to describe the reliability of wireless networks.
6estimation techniques (e.g. [32]). We will relaxing the assumptions in Section V by considering
correlated channels2.
In this section, we focus on the symmetric users, where the channels have the same error
probability, i.e., P(si(t) = 0) = pe for all t and i, while the asymmetric case will be studied in
Section III. In this paper, we do not consider the mobility, i.e., the users are all staying in the
same location for a certain amount of time; as such, assume a constant error probability in the
following.
We are interested in the completion time that is the expected time the BS takes to successfully
send q to all users. Let T= be the completion time for broadcasting the common interest to both
users. We then can get3
T= = p
2
e(1 + T=) + (1− pe)
2 · 1 + 2pe(1− pe)(1 +
1
1− pe
) (1)
=
2pe + 1
1− p2e
,
where the second term in right-hand side (RHS) of Eq. (1) takes advantage of the broadcast
medium when both channels are ON.
Here, we remark that though traditionally the users communicate with the BS via their cellular
links independently (i.e., the BS does not know if both users are requesting the same content; as
such, can only unicast their requested packets respectively), in Appendix A we will discuss an
implementation of identifying the common interest; as such, the BS would deliver the common
packet q over the broadcast B2D. Moreover, we show that identifying the common interest under
the unreliable networks will not that effective, as stated precisely in the following lemma.
Lemma 1. Let T6= be the completion time for the BS to deliver the common interest over the
unicast B2D. The improvement ratio R6=/= (defined below) from identifying the common interest
is
R6=/= :=
T6=
T=
=
pe + 2
2pe + 1
.
In particular, the ratio is 2 when pe = 0; the ratio is 1.25 when pe = 0.5.
Proof: Please see Appendix A.
2The imperfect channel estimation and delayed feedback of the estimated channel states are beyond the scope of this paper.
3If we consider a network consisting of only a BS and a user with its B2D channel error probability pe, the BS takes the
expected time of 1/(1− pe) to successfully deliver a packet to the user.
7We observe that the decrease of the improvement ratio R6=/= in pe is faster than a linear
function (i.e., a convex function). In particular, when the channels are terrible (i.e., pe → 1), the
identification almost cannot decrease the completion time.
A. Motivating social grouping
To further utilize the common interest, we take advantage of the existing D2D communication
technology. In other words, we are considering the hybrid networks including B2D and D2D
communications. We assume that D2D communications do not occupy the same channels as
B2D communications. When a user is making a local transmission over a D2D network, the
BS can save bandwidth to serve other users. Moreover, we reasonably consider the half-duplex
technique, i.e., each user is not allowed to use both B2D and D2D interfaces simultaneously,
and cannot transmit and receive a packet at the same time. Because of a short-distance com-
munication, we assume that the D2D channels between the users are noiseless, while imperfect
D2D communications will be discussed in Subsection V-B.
However, the local users are selfish or not cooperative in general, we propose a non-monetary
incentive mechanism, called equal-reciprocal incentive, which fairly requests the users to share
the same expected amount of content with each other. By means of the equal-reciprocal incentive
scheme, the neighboring users c1 and c2 are motivated to form a social group. Here, we assume
that the users are rational, who can be motivated by the equal-reciprocal incentive and follow
the incentive algorithm, but not malicious, who do not want to share the content. To exclude the
malicious users, the users in the social group can exchange a key before any content transfer;
as such, users outside the social group cannot decode received packets from the social group.
Moreover, the BS can be the identity who isolates the malicious users from the social group,
as in the paper the BS is responsible for regulating transmissions between the users, including
who should be included in the group and who should share their own content at a time.
We note that the equal-reciprocal incentive for the two symmetric users is similar to the tit-
for-tat scheme (based on unicast communications), while it will be quite different and efficient
for scenarios of more than two users due to broadcast D2D communications, which will be
discussed later. Moreover, we will show that the equal-reciprocal incentive not only provides a
fairness guarantee like the tit-fot-tat, it also maximizes a local utility assuring that a user can
get the maximum amount of content from the social group (see Subection V-C).
To analyze the completion time subject to the equal-reciprocal incentive, we consider a sharing
probability pi→j that ci shares the received packet with cj when only ci has got the packet. Then,
8the expected number of packets sent from ci to cj is (1 − pe)pepi→j . To motivate the social
grouping with the equal-reciprocal constraint, we need p1→2 = p2→1.
Let T∪ be the completion time to deliver the common interest over the broadcast B2D and
D2D if c1 and c2 are incentivized to form the social group, then
T∪ = p
2
e(1 + T∪) + (1− pe)
2 · 1 + 2(1− pe)pe
(
p1→2 · 2 + (1− p1→2)(1 +
1
1− pe
)
)
,
when p1→2 = p2→1. To minimize the completion time, we optimally choose p∗1→2 = p∗2→1 = 1,
then we have
T ∗∪ =
−2p2e + 2pe + 1
1− p2e
.
Definition 2. An optimal equal-reciprocal scheme is a sharing policy (i.e., sharing probabilities)
that minimizes the completion time subject to the equal-reciprocal constraint.
We notice that in this symmetric case, the optimal equal-reciprocal scheme does not lose any
performance compared to the full cooperation (i.e., both users are always willing to help each
other without an incentive scheme). Yet, this is not the case in the asymmetric case, as will be
discussed in Section III.
Lemma 3. The improvement from the social grouping is
R=/∪ :=
T=
T ∗∪
=
2pe + 1
−2p2e + 2pe + 1
.
In particular, the ratio is 1 when pe = 0; the ratio is 1.33 when pe = 0.5.
In Lemma 3, such an improvement is due to the local sharing in the D2D network. With the
aid of the incentivized social group, the identified common interest can significantly reduce the
completion time even in terrible B2D communication environment, i.e., pe → 1 (the ratio is 3
when pe = 1).
B. Large symmetric networks
In this subsection, we are extending the discussion to a large network consisting of a BS
and N wireless users c1, c2, · · · , cN . These N users are within the proximity of each other, and
desire a common interest. We consider the symmetric users with the same error probability pe.
By T (N)= we denote the completion time to deliver the common interest over the broadcast
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Fig. 3. Completion time T (N)= (see Eq. (2)) for large symmetric networks with common interest identification and no social
grouping.
B2D. We present T (N)= in recursion: T (0)= = 0, and for all n = 1, · · · , N ,
T (n)= =
n∑
i=0
(
n
i
)
pie(1− pe)
N−i(1 + T (i)= ), (2)
where 1 + T (i)= is the expected number of transmissions under condition that i users do not get
the packet from the BS’s first broadcast. We show T (N)= in Fig. 3, where T (N)= increases in N
and depends on pe.
We further exploit the local sharing benefit among users by means of broadcast D2D. We
generalize the idea of the equal-reciprocal mechanism by ensuring that each pair in the social
group share the same expected amount of content with each other. Due to the broadcast D2D
channels among the local users, the analysis of the equal-reciprocal incentive will be different
from the tit-for-tat incentive for P2P networks (based on unicast communications).
Let R be the set of remaining users that do not get the packet after the first B2D transmission.
By pi→R we denote a sharing probability that user ci shares the packet with R when ci has got
the packet.
Lemma 4. The optimal equal reciprocal scheme for large symmetric networks is as follows: to
pick a user who is responsible for the broadcast with the equal probability; in particular, we
select
p∗i→R =
1
N − |R|
. (3)
Proof: The policy incentivizes all N users to participate in the social group as the equal-
reciprocal constraint holds for all pairs of the local users. Moreover, with the choice of the
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sharing probability, if there exists a user that has got the packet, all clients can recover the
packet in the next time slot as
∑
i/∈R p
∗
i→R = 1 according to Eq. (3).
Let T (N)∪ be the completion time to deliver the common interest over the broadcast B2D and
D2D, associated with the sharing probability in Eq. (3). Then, we have
T
(N)
∪ =p
N
e (1 + T
(N)
∪ ) + (1− pe)
N + 2
(
1− pNe − (1− pe)
N
) (4)
=1 +
1− (1− pe)
N
1− pNe
,
where the third term in RHS of Eq. (4) reflects the local content sharing in the group, i.e., one
of the users that has received the packet in the first time slot will broadcast it such that all users
in the group can recover the packet.
Note that T (N)∪ is monotonic in N , but can be increasing or decreasing due to the tradeoff:
• More users to serve: As the number of local users increases, the probability that all B2D
channels are ON decreases;
• User diversity increases: As the number of local users increases, the probability that one
user receives the packet at the first transmission increases.
Lemma 5. When pe < 0.5, T (N)∪ increases in N . When pe > 0.5, T
(N)
∪ decreases in N . When
pe = 0.5, T
(N)
∪ = 2 for all N . Moreover, T (N)∪ approaches 2 when N →∞, independent of pe,
while T (N)= is sensitive to pe as shown in Fig. 3.
When the B2D channels are quite unreliable (i.e., pe > 0.5), a larger social group can better
use the user diversity advantage and shorten the completion time.
III. GENERAL ASYMMETRIC NETWORKS
Thus far, the optimal equal-reciprocal scheme can satisfy all symmetric users in the next time
slot once one user has got the packet. In this section, we analyze the optimal equal-reciprocal
scheme for asymmetric users.
A. Two asymmetric users
We first reconsider the simple network in Fig. 2, but the channel between the BS and each
user ci has an error probability pe,i. Without loss of generality, we assume that pe,1 < pe,2.
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1) No content sharing: If c1 and c2 do not share any content, the completion time for delivering
the common interest over broadcast B2D is
T= =
1
1− pe,1pe,2
[
pe,1pe,2 + (1− pe,1)(1− pe,2) +
pe,1(1− pe,2)
(
1 +
1
1− pe,1
)
+ pe,2(1− pe,1)
(
1 +
1
1− pe,2
)]
. (5)
2) Full cooperation: We consider that c1 and c2 are always help each other. We refer to this
case as a full cooperation. We use this case as a benchmark for later comparison purpose with
another case. Then, the completion time Tf is
Tf =
1
1− pe,1pe,2
[
pe,1pe,2 + (1− pe,1)(1− pe,2) + pe,1(1− pe,2) · 2 + pe,2(1− pe,1) · 2
]
,
where the last two terms indicate the full cooperation: if either one receives the packet, it will
share with the other one, resulting in totally two time slots.
With the full cooperation, the expected amount of packets sent from ci to cj is (1−pe,i)pe,jpi→j .
As pe,1 < pe,2, if c1 and c2 always help each other, i.e., p1→2 = p2→1 = 1, then
(1− pe,2)pe,1p2→1 < (1− pe,1)pe,2p1→2.
However, if c1 and c2 can be selfish in general, the full cooperation does not result in a fair
situation as c1 needs to share more packets with c2. Thus, it is difficult for the selfish c1 and c2
to establish the full cooperation.
3) Equal-reciprocal incentive: To motivate the selfish c1 and c2 to form a social group,
we apply the proposed equal-reciprocal incentive. Using the equal-reciprocal constraint as an
incentive, we fairly choose a unique sharing probability pi→j such that
(1− pe,2)pe,1p2→1 = (1− pe,1)pe,2p1→2.
To minimize the completion time, we optimally select
p∗1→2 =
(1− pe,2)pe,1
(1− pe,1)pe,2
< 1; p∗2→1 = 1. (6)
The intuition is that c2 is associated with a worse B2D channel, so in the long-run it get fewer
packets from the BS than c1. Hence, to minimize the completion time, it is the best that c2
always share content, while c1 share partial content with the same amount as c2. Then, the
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optimal completion time T ∗∪ in the presence of the incentivized social group is
T ∗∪ =
1
1− pe,1pe,2
{
pe,1pe,2 + (1− pe,1)(1− pe,2) + (1− pe,2)pe,1 · 2
+ (1− pe,1)pe,2 ·
[(1− pe,2)pe,1
(1− pe,1)pe,2
· 2 +
pe,2 − pe,1
(1− pe,1)pe,2
(1 +
1
1− pe,2
)
]}
. (7)
By comparing T ∗∪ and Tf , we notice the performance loss from the benchmark case due to
the user asymmetry and selfishness. We then conclude in the following lemma.
Lemma 6. Under our optimal equal-reciprocal scheme, to motivate the asymmetric c1 and c2 to
form the social group has a shorter completion time, i.e., T ∗∪ ≤ T=. Moreover, the incentivized
social group has a performance loss compared with the full cooperation, i.e.,
T ∗∪ − Tf =
∆
1− (pe,2 −∆)pe,2
(
1
1− pe,2
− 1),
where ∆ = pe,2 − pe,1.
Taking the derivative to the above equation, we get
d
d∆
(T ∗∪ − Tf ) =
1− p2e,2
(pe,2∆+ 1− p
2
e,2)
2
,
and remark that
•
d
d∆
(T ∗∪ − Tf) > 0; hence, T ∗∪ − Tf increases in ∆;
• the rate d
d∆
(T ∗∪ − Tf ) decreases as the difference ∆ increases.
B. Large asymmetric networks
We focus on a network consisting of three users c1, c2, and c3 with the channel error
probabilities pe,1, pe,2, and pe,3, respectively, while a more general network can be easily extended.
Without loss of generality, we assume that pe,1 ≤ pe,2 ≤ pe,3.
We remind that pi→R is the sharing probability of ci with a user set R. According to following
eight cases associated with all possible channel states s(t) = (s1(t), s2(t), s3(t)) at time t = 1,
we work out the completion time T∪ for delivering the common interest with social grouping
of c1, c2, c3. Let Ti be the completion time for case i.
1) If s(1) = (0, 1, 1): the completion time T1 = 2, where we select p2→1 and p3→1 such that
p2→1 + p3→1 = 1. Similar to Eq. (6), the selection is optimal.
2) If s(1) = (1, 0, 1): the completion time T2 = 2, where we select that p1→2 + p3→2 = 1.
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3) If s(1) = (1, 1, 0): the completion time
T3 = (p1→3 + p2→3) · 2 + (1− p1→3 − p2→3)(1 +
1
1− pe,3
),
where the first term results from the content sharing in the social group, while the second
one is due to the re-transmissions from the BS.
4) If s(1) = (0, 0, 1): the completion time T4 = 2, where we select that p3→1,2 = 1 due to
the worst channel condition.
5) If s(1) = (0, 1, 0): the completion time is given in Eq. (8), where the first term implies
that c2 broadcasts the packet to c1 and c3, while the remaining terms are because c2 does
not share the content but c1 and c3 help each other with some probability as in Eq. (7).
6) If s(1) = (1, 0, 0): the completion time T6 is similar to Eq. (8).
7) If s(1) = (1, 1, 1): the completion time T7 = 1.
8) If s(1) = (0, 0, 0): the completion time T8 = T∪.
It is easy to evaluate the probability P(case i) of case i; then, the completion time is
T∪ =
P(case 8) +
∑7
i=1 P(case i)Ti
1− pe,1pe,2pe,3
. (9)
We note that the completion time T∪ is a linear function of the sharing probabilities, and
hence conclude as follows.
Theorem 7. We can get the optimal completion time T ∗∪ and the optimal equal-reciprocal scheme
(i.e., the optimal sharing probabilities) by formulating a linear program as follows.
Linear program:
min
P(case 8) +
∑7
i=1 P(case i)Ti
1− pe,1pe,2pe,3
Subject to the following constraints:
T5 = p2→1,3 · 2 + (1− p2→1,3)
[
1 +
1
1− pe,1pe,3
[
pe,1pe,3 + (1− pe,1)(1− pe,3) + 2pe,1(1− pe,3)+
pe,3(1− pe,1)
[2(1− pe,3)pe,1
(1− pe,1)pe,3
+
pe,3 − pe,1
(1− pe,1)pe,3
(1 +
1
1− pe,3
)
]]]
.
(8)
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(Const. 1) Equal-reciprocal constraint between c1 and c2:
(1− pe,1)pe,2 [pe,3 · p1→2,3 + (1− pe,3)p1→2] = pe,1(1− pe,2) [pe,3 · p2→1,3 + (1− pe,3)p2→1] .
(Const. 2) Equal-reciprocal constraint between c1 and c3:
(1− pe,1)pe,3 [pe,2 · p1→2,3 + (1− pe,2)p1→3] = pe,1(1− pe,3) [pe,2 · p3→1,2 + (1− pe,2)p3→1] .
(Const. 3) Equal-reciprocal constraint between c2 and c3:
(1− pe,2)pe,3 [pe,1 · p2→1,3 + (1− pe,1)p2→3] = pe,3(1− pe,2) [pe,1 · p3→1,2 + (1− pe,1)p3→2] .
(Const. 4) For the cases 1, 2, and 3, the total sharing probability to ci is no more than one
for all i:
p2→1 + p3→1 = 1; p1→2 + p3→2 = 1; p1→3 + p2→3 ≤ 1.
(Const. 5) All sharing probabilities are less than or equal to one.
We remark that the linearity of the completion time still holds for N users; as such, the optimal
completion time for the N users can be derived, though complicated, by recursively solving the
linear program for i users (poly-time solvable), where 1 ≤ i ≤ N . We want to emphasize that
Sections II and III work on the performance analysis of the equal-reciprocal incentive for a
common interest, whereas we will propose on-line algorithms selecting a user to share at a time,
without the complex computation of the sharing probabilities.
As there is no closed-form solution for the linear program, we numerically demonstrate the
improvement ratio of T=/T ∗∪ in Fig. 4, where each curve is for a particular pair of (pe,1, pe,2)
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Fig. 5. Example queueing network
and starts with pe,3 > pe,2.
Thus far, the sharing probabilities are chosen to motivate all neighboring users to join in the
social group. However, we have understood that adding a user with a poor B2D channel will
reduce sharing opportunity in the group. Hence, to incentivize a user or not is a question. We
conclude as follows.
Theorem 8. To incentivize all neighboring users to form a social group minimizes the completion
time, no matter what the distribution of B2D channel errors is.
Proof: See Appendix B.
IV. ON-LINE SCHEDULING FOR DYNAMIC CONTENT ARRIVALS
As we considered single common interest before, we did not need to schedule transmissions
for lots of packets. In this section, we further consider time-varying packet arrivals at the BS,
and aim at designing on-line transmission scheduling algorithms that decide who (i.e., the BS
or users) should transmit content for each time. Based on the algorithm, the BS will adaptively
select a user to share received content (if needed) such that the equal-reciprocal incentive is
met. As the algorithm is on-line fashion, our incentive design does not need to pre-compute
the sharing probabilities in advance and would be effective to keep communications in timely
fashion. Moreover, by simply using additional one bit to indicate sharing or not, the users can
be informed. In summary, our algorithm is efficient in both time and space.
Different from the discussions before, networks in this section include queues in the BS to
store content that will be delivered to users. For a clear explanation, we present our design in the
context of a queueing network in Fig. 5, where we consider three asymmetric users. We remark
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Fig. 6. Virtual network of Fig. 5, where the gray nodes are the destination nodes.
that our design can be easily extended for any number of users, which will be discussed later.
We consider the ON/OFF B2D channels and the perfect D2D channels first, while correlated
B2D channels and imperfect D2D transmissions are discussed in Section V.
In addition to the time-varying channels, we start to consider time-varying packet arrivals,
where packets in a queue Q are common interests for c1, c2, and c3. The arrival process is
assumed to be i.i.d. over time. Let λ be the packet arrival rate to the queue Q. We say that the
queue is stable for λ (see [33]) if the time average queue length is finite when the arrival rate
at the BS is λ.
A stability region consists of all arrival rates λ such that there exists a transmission schedule
ensuring that the queue is stable. A scheduling algorithm is throughput-optimal if the queue is
stable for all arrival rates interior of the stability region. Moreover, by Λ we denote an equal-
reciprocal stability region that is the stability region subject to the equal-reciprocal constraint. We
then re-define an optimal equal-reciprocal scheme for this dynamic case as a scheduling algorithm
that stabilizes the queue and meets the equal-reciprocal constraint for all arrival rates interior
of Λ. In other words, the optimal equal-reciprocal scheme is throughput-optimal subject to the
equal-reciprocal incentive. Because of the time-varying channels and packet arrivals, scheduling
algorithms will depend on the channel state, rate, and queue size.
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A. Optimal centralized scheduling under the equal-reciprocal incentive
As the network in Fig. 5 includes the multiple multicasts, the first step of our scheduling
design is to create a virtual network as shown in Fig. 6. In general, we are innovating on the
lossy broadcast network by applying prior theory about wireline networks (e.g., [33]). We discuss
the idea of the virtual network in the following ten steps.
1) Create a virtual node va1,2,3 corresponding to the real queue Q : If a real packet arrives
at Q, a virtual packet is created in va1,2,3 .
2) Create a virtual node v(1,1,1)1,2,3 that has the empty queue: The virtual node is the destination
of the virtual packets in va1,2,3 . If a virtual packet arrives at v
(1,1,1)
a1,2,3 , the corresponding real
packet is successfully delivered.
3) Create a virtual node vi related to user ci for i = 1, 2, 3: A virtual packet in vi implies
that user ci should store the packet and share it when scheduled.
4) Create a virtual node v(r1,r2,r3)1,2,3 for r1, r2, r3 = 0, 1: The virtual nodes are associated with
the re-transmission status of the BS. The superscript ri indicates if user ci has received the
packet or not, where if ri = 1 the packet has reached at ci; else not yet. For example, a
virtual packet in the node v(1,1,0)1,2,3 means that the corresponding packet in the real network
has been received by c1 and c2, but not by c3.
5) Create a virtual link va1,2,3 → vi, for i = 1, 2, 3, associated with an ON/OFF channel: The
virtual link is ON at time t when si(t) = 1 and sj(t) = x for all j 6= i, where x can be
either 0 or 1; else, the virtual link is OFF.
6) Create a virtual link vi → v(1,1,1)1,2,3 associated with a noiseless channel for i = 1, 2, 3: The
virtual links are always ON because of the noiseless D2D channels among the users c1,
c1, and c3.
7) Create a virtual link va1,2,3 → v(r1,r2,r3)1,2,3 associated with an ON/OFF channel for r1, r2, r3 =
0, 1: The virtual link is ON at time t when si(t) = ri, for i = 1, 2, 3.
8) Create a virtual link vr1,r2,r31,2,3 → v(r
′
1,r
′
2,r
′
3)
1,2,3 associated with an ON/OFF channel for r1, r2, r3 =
0, 1 and r′i ≥ ri for all i: The virtual link is ON at time t when (i) si(t) = x if ri = 1,
for i = 1, 2, 3 (i.e., if ci has received the packet, re-transmitting the packet does not need
to consider the B2D channel to ci); (ii) si(t) = r′i if ri = 0, for i = 1, 2, 3.
9) All virtual links cause interference to each other: That implies that in the real network a
user cannot simultaneously transmit and receive a packet and cannot use B2D and D2D
interfaces at the same time.
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Algorithm 1: Optimal on-line scheduling algorithm
input : A network instance of Fig. 5
output: Scheduling decision for each time
/* Virtual network construction */
1 Construct a virtual network as shown in Fig. 6;
2 Add other virtual queues hi,j to the virtual network, for i = 1, 2 and i+ 1 ≤ j ≤ 3;
/* Virtual link scheduling for each time t */
3 For each virtual link l = u→ d in Fig. 6, we define a weight Wl(t) and a variable µl(t) as
Wl(t) = max{0, Vu(t)− Vd(t)};
µl(t) =
{
1 if virtual link l is ON and scheduled;
0 else;
4 Define a variable ni,j(t) for i, j = 1, 2, 3 as
ni,j(t) =
{
1 if virtual link va1,2,3 → vi is scheduled and sj(t) = 0;
0 else;
5 Schedule the virtual link l∗ ∈ L that maximizes
∑
l∈L
Wl(t)µl(t) +
2∑
i=1
3∑
j=i+1
Hi,j(t)(nj,i(t)− ni,j(t)); (10)
/* Real packet scheduling for each time t */
6 if va1,2,3 → vi, for i = 1, 2, 3, is scheduled then
7 the BS transmits the corresponding packet, while ci needs to store the packet and broadcast it when
scheduled in the future;
8 end
9 if vi → v(1,1,1)1,2,3 is scheduled then
10 user ci is scheduled to share the corresponding packet;
11 end
12 if va1,2,3 → v
(r1,r2,r3)
1,2,3 or v
(r1,r2,r3)
1,2,3 → v
(r
′
1
,r
′
2
,r
′
3
)
1,2,3 , for ri = 0, 1, r
′
i ≥ ri, and i = 1, 2, 3, is scheduled then
13 the BS broadcasts the corresponding packet;
14 end
/* Virtual queueing update */
15 foreach virtual link u→ d that is scheduled do
16 Vu(t+ 1) = max{0, Vu(t)− 1};
17 Vd(t+ 1) = Vd(t) + 1;
18 end
19 if there is an arrival to va1,2,3 then
20 Increase its virtual queue size by 1;
21 end
22 Hi,j(t+ 1) = Hi,j(t) + ni,j(t)− nj,i(t) for i = 1, 2, and i+ 1 ≤ j ≤ 3;
10) Except for the virtual node v(1,1,1)1,2,3 , other virtual nodes have their own virtual queues.
Let V be the set of all vertices in Fig. 6. For each time t, if a virtual link u→ d is scheduled,
a virtual packet is delivered from an upstream virtual node u ∈ V to a downstream virtual node
d ∈ V; meanwhile, their virtual queue sizes are updated: Vu(t + 1) = max{0, Vu(t) − 1} and
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Vd(t + 1) = Vd(t) + 1 (see Lines 16 and 17 of Alg. 1 as introduced soon).
Now, we are ready to propose an optimal equal-reciprocal scheme in Alg. 1. The proposed
algorithm has four important parts: (1) virtual network construction; (2) virtual link scheduling;
(3) real packet scheduling; (4) queueing update.
We notice that transmission schedules in the real network are associated with the virtual
link schedules, as described in Lines 6-14. With the relationship between the real and virtual
networks, the real network is stable if and only if the virtual network is stable. Moreover, a
more general result is stated in the following lemma.
Lemma 9. The stability region of the virtual network (in Fig. 6) is the same as that of the real
network (in Fig. 5).
We remark that the virtual network can be divided into two parts (see Fig. 6), where the left one
is related to the local content sharing, while the right one is corresponding to re-transmissions
from the BS. Then, the optimal equal-reciprocal scheme will schedule the virtual link such that
the virtual queue is stable and the local sharing meets the equal-reciprocal constraint, for all
packet arrival rates interior of Λ.
Motivated by [25], in Line 2 of Alg. 1 we introduce other virtual queues hi,j for i = 1, 2 and
i + 1 ≤ j ≤ 3, with the virtual queue size Hi,j(t) at time t. By ni,j(t) we indicate if at time
t the BS broadcasts a packet to ci who will need to store and share the packet with cj when
scheduled in the future. That is, if virtual link va1,2,3 → vi is scheduled at time t and the channel
state sj(t) = 0, then ni,j(t) = 1. We describe the queueing dynamics of hi,j in Line 22 of Alg.
1, and have the following result.
Lemma 10. If hi,j for all i = 1, 2 and i + 1 ≤ j ≤ 3 are stable, then the equal-reciprocal
constraint is met.
Proof: According to the queueing dynamics of hi,j , we get
Hi,j(t) = Hi,j(0) +
t∑
τ=0
ni,j(t)− nj,i(t).
Dividing both sides above by t yields
Hi,j(t)
t
=
∑t
τ=0 ni,j(t)− nj,i(t)
t
.
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Let t → ∞, and we know that the number of packets shared between ci and cj is equal if the
virtual queue hi,j is stable.
Thus, the optimal equal-reciprocal scheme further becomes to schedule the virtual links such
that all virtual queues, including the virtual queues in Fig. 6 and hi,j for all i = 1, 2 and
i+ 1 ≤ j ≤ 3, are stable for all arrival rates interior of Λ.
To that end, we apply a back-pressure type algorithm [25, 33]. Let L be a set of all the virtual
links. Hence, we optimally schedule the virtual link set l∗ ∈ L according to Line 5 with some
weights defined in Lines 3 and 4, which are related to the number of served packets if a virtual
link is scheduled.
Because the virtual link schedule in Alg. 1 can stabilize all virtual queues and satisfy the
equal-reciprocal constraint for all arrival rates interior of Λ, we conclude as follows.
Theorem 11. The proposed on-line scheduling algorithm in Alg. 1 is an optimal equal-reciprocal
scheme.
Our scheduling design can be extended to any number of neighboring users. First, each link
va1,··· → vi in the local sharing part is associated with an ON/OFF channel, which is ON at
time t when si(t) = 1. Second, each link in the re-transmission part is associated with another
ON/OFF channel according to the users who have not received the packet yet (similar to the
steps 7 and 8 in Subsection IV-A). Based on the virtual network, the proposed Alg. 1 can be
easily generalized.
B. Sub-optimal distributed scheduling under the equal-reciprocal incentive
In Alg. 1, transmissions within the social group are scheduled by the BS, so the BS needs to
inform a user to broadcast a packet by sending an additional message. To reduce these control
overhead, we hence develop a distributed algorithm in this subsection. The idea is that if a virtual
link va1,2,3 → vi is scheduled at present, the virtual link vi → v
(1,1,1)
1,2,3 needs to be scheduled in
the next time slot. In this way, broadcasts in the social group do not need to be scheduled by
the BS. Hence, the virtual link schedule is made at the beginning of each time, except for the
time slot after virtual link va1,2,3 → vi is scheduled.
Due to the restriction of the scheduling set, the distributed algorithm leads to a smaller equal-
reciprocal stability region (say Λd) than the centralized algorithm. Next, we will design a dynamic
algorithm that achieves the region Λd.
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The distributed algorithm is similar to Alg. 1 with some modifications as follows. First, we
re-define the variable as
µl(t) =


0.5 if link l = va1,2,3 → vi for i = 1, 2, 3 is ON and scheduled;
1 if other link l is ON and scheduled;
0 else.
The notion of the re-defined µl(t) is that if link va1,2,3 → vi, for i = 1, 2, 3, is scheduled at present,
the virtual link vi → v(1,1,1)1,2,3 must be scheduled in the next time slot; hence, the scheduled packet
takes two time slots. Second, we re-define the set L as the set of all virtual links excluding
vi → v
(1,1,1)
1,2,3 for all i = 1, 2, 3.
Then, the virtual link is scheduled as follows. If va1,2,3 → vi, for i = 1, 2, 3, is scheduled at
present, user ci needs to broadcast the received packet in the next time slot; otherwise, we select
a virtual link based on Eq. (10) with the newly defined µl(t) and L. We note that size |L| in the
distributed algorithm is smaller, and thus the complexity of the distributed algorithm is smaller
than the centralized one.
We conclude as follows using the frame-based Lyapunov theorem [33, 34].
Theorem 12. The distributed scheduling algorithm achieves the regionΛd and satisfies the equal-
reciprocal incentive. Moreover, our distributed algorithm has two advantages over the centralized
one: requiring no control message exchange with BS and achieving lower complexity.
C. Equal-reciprocal stability regions for the two symmetric users
Though a lower complexity of the distributed algorithm, the distributed algorithm has perfor-
mance loss in the equal-reciprocal stability region. In this subsection, we compare the regions
of the centralized and distributed algorithms, with the focus on the local sharing part for the two
symmetric users scenario, while a more general network is numerically studied in Subsection
IV-D.
We start with describing the equal-reciprocal stability region of the centralized algorithm. Fig.
7 illustrates the virtual network for the two symmetric users. Because of the symmetric users,
we can combine both virtual nodes v1 and v2 as a virtual node v as shown in Fig. 8. By ξ1, ξ2,
and ξ3 we denote the packet service rates of the links va1,2 → v
(1,1)
1,2 , va1,2 → v, and v → v
(1,1)
1,2 ;
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then, the region can be expressed as follows.
λ = ξ1 + ξ2; ξ2 = ξ3;
ξ1 ≤ (1− pe)
2; ξ2 ≤ 2pe(1− pe); ξ3 ≤ 1;
ξ1 + ξ2 ≤ 1− p
2
e; ξ2 + ξ3 ≤ 1; ξ1 + ξ3 ≤ 1;
ξ1 + ξ2 + ξ3 ≤ 1.
These constraints come from the fact that the maximum number of packets that can be transmitted
at each time is one. By simplifying the above constraints, we derive the equal-reciprocal stability
region of the centralized algorithm as follows.
λ ≤ 1− p2e.
In Fig. 9, we show the equivalent virtual network for the distributed algorithm, where we
combine the virtual node v1, v2, and v(1,1)1,2 as a virtual node v; as such, the time for transmitting
a virtual packet over va1,2 → v is two as it takes into account the time for both link va1,2 → vi
and vi → v(1,1)1,2 for i = 1, 2. Therefore, we segment the timeline into frames, which size is
one or two time slots if the virtual link va1,2 → v
(1,1)
1,2 or va1,2 → v, respectively, is scheduled.
Similar to [34], we then can derive the equal-reciprocal capacity region of the distributed based
on algorithm as
λ ·
(
(1− pe)
2 · 1 + p2e · 1 + 2pe(1− pe) · 2
)
≤ 1− p2e,
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Fig. 10. Equal-reciprocal stability region comparison between the centralized and distributed algorithms
where the left term is the expected number of arrivals in a frame and the right one is the
maximum number of packets that can be transmitted within a frame. We show both stability
regions in Fig. 10 and conclude as follows.
Lemma 13. For the two symmetric users, the ratio of the equal-reciprocal stability region
between the centralize and the distributed algorithms is 1+2pe−2p2e. Moreover, when pe = 1/2,
the distributed algorithm has the largest stability region loss (see Fig. 10).
D. More numerical studies
In this subsection, we numerically study the proposed centralized and distributed algorithms
for the network example in Fig. 5, where we fix the channel error probabilities of c1, c2, c3 to be
0.2, 0.4, 0.6, respectively. We will compare the proposed algorithms with a throughput-optimal
scheduling algorithm without incentivizing the social grouping, i.e., all virtual links in the local
sharing part of Fig. 6 are removed.
We show the average queue size and the average completion time of a packet in Figs. 11 and 12.
We observe that the approximate distributed algorithm still outperforms the throughput-optimal
algorithm without social grouping, and its performance is close to the centralized algorithm.
Moreover, we demonstrate in Fig. 13 the ratio of packets that are shared among the users c1, c2,
or c3 (i.e., #total packets shared by the users#total packets at the BS ), which is referred to as the local content sharing probability.
We notice that the local sharing probability increases as the packet arrival rate increases.
V. FURTHER DISCUSSIONS
We further discuss the equal-reciprocal scheme by considering correlated channel models,
unreliable local communications, and a local utility of each individual user.
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Fig. 11. Average queue size versus λ.
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A. Channels with memory
In this subsection, we extend our results to channel models with memory. To get a clear
engineering insight, we investigate the two symmetric users in Section II again. In particular,
we consider a two-state Markov chain as the channel model, with the state si(t) ∈ {0, 1} at
time t and the stationary transition probabilities ζi,j from state i to j, i.e., ζ01 = P(si(t + 1) =
1|si(t) = 0), and ζ10 = P(si(t+1) = 0|si(t) = 1). Then, we can get the steady-state probabilities
pi0 = ζ10/(ζ01 + ζ10) and pi1 = ζ01/(ζ01 + ζ10).
Let Tij be the expected time from state i to j, which can be calculated by the following
equation.
T01 = ζ00(1 + T01) + ζ01 · 1 =
1
ζ01
.
We hence can calculate the completion time T= at the steady state:
T= = pi
2
0(1 + T=) + pi
2
1 · 1 + 2pi0pi1(1 +
1
ζ01
) =
1 + 2pi0(1−pi0)
ζ01
1− pi20
.
Similar to Subsection II-A, we get T ∗∪ = (−2pi20 + 2pi0 + 1)/(1− pi20). To conclude, we find the
improvement ratio is
R=/∪ =
2pi0(1−pi0)
ζ01
+ 1
−2pi20 + 2pi0 + 1
.
Remark 14. The improvement ratio is 1 when ζ01 = 1; the ratio is 1.33 when ζ01 = ζ10 = 0.5;
the ratio is 3 when ζ01 → 0, which is consistent with Lemma 3. In other words, our results and
engineering intuition can be extended to the Markov-modulated channels.
Remark 15. Regarding the dynamic-arrival case, the proposed on-line Alg. 1 can be applied
for finite-state Markov chains, which can be proven using the frame-based Lyapunov technique
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[33] where the frame sizes are the transition times between the states.
B. Unreliable local communications
We reconsider the simple two symmetric users, but the channel between the two users can be
OFF with a probability γ. To that end, we assume that the BS has to decide if a user will share
a packet when receiving it. In other words, the users will keep a copy of each packet only if
being informed of sharing. We get T∪:
T∪ = p
2
e(1 + T∪) + (1− pe)
2 · 1 + 2(1− pe)pe
(
p1→2 · (1 +
1
1− γ
) + (1− p1→2)(1 +
1
1− pe
)
)
.
Then, if γ ≤ pe, the optimal sharing probability p∗1→2 = 1; moreover,
T ∗∪ =
1 + 2pe(1−pe)
1−γ
1− p2e
,
and the improvement ratio is
R=/∪ =
2pe + 1
2pe(1−pe)
1−γ
+ 1
. (11)
Remark 16. If γ ≤ pe, the ratio is 1 when pe = 0, and 3 when pe = 1, which is consistent with
Lemma 3 again; moreover, the ratio is 2
0.5/(1−γ)+1
when pe = 0.5, where there is a performance
loss due to γ. Otherwise, if γ ≥ pe, the optimal sharing probability p∗1→2 = 0, i.e., there is be no
cooperation. As usually local short-distance communication quality is better than long-distance
communications with remote BSs, to motivate local users to construct a social group would be
promising, though there will be a little bit performance loss due to the imperfect D2D (see Eq.
(11)).
Remark 17. Alg. 1 can be extended for unreliable D2D networks, while the local sharing part
would be similar to the re-transmission part but the corresponding link error probabilities are
associated with the error probabilities between the users.
C. Individual performance under the optimal equal-reciprocal scheme
Subject to the equal-reciprocal constraint, users are motivated to form a social group because
of the fairness guarantee, while the optimal equal-reciprocal scheme minimizes the completion
time. We finally discuss whether and how the optimal equal-reciprocal scheme further benefits
each individual user.
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We define a utility ui of user ci as the difference between the amount of packets downloaded
from social groups and those uploaded from user ci:
ui = (#downloaded by ci) - (#uploaded by ci).
The motivation of the utility is that long-distance B2D communications are more expensive
than local D2D communications (e.g., see [2]), and therefore a user would like to save cost
by downloading content from a social group while only upload a smaller amount of content in
return.
First, we notice that the tit-for-tat incentive results in the zero utility due to unicast commu-
nications. We show in the next theorem that the optimal equal-reciprocal scheme maximizes the
local utility of each user subject to the equal reciprocal constraint.
Theorem 18. The optimal equal-reciprocal schemes (in Sections II and III) (locally) maximize
the utility ui of each individual ci, for all i, subject to the equal-reciprocal constraint.
Proof: Let αi→j be the expected amount of content user ci shares with cj . Due to the equal-
reciprocal constraint, we need αj→i = αi→j for all i, j. Then, the utility ui depends on αi→j for
all j.
For a user ci, we assume the optimal equal-reciprocal scheme results in α∗i→j for all j. We
consider two cases as follows:
• αi→j < α
∗
i→j for some j: Because of the broadcast medium and the equal-reciprocal
constraint, each user can get at least one packet in return when broadcasting a packet.
Hence, the utility is an increasing function in αi,j , i.e., ui(αi→j) < ui(α∗i→j).
• αi→j > α
∗
i→j for some j : Suppose ui(αi→j) > ui(α∗i→j). Then, more content can be shared
among users subject to the equal-reciprocal constraint, and the completion time can be
further reduced. We then get a contraction to the optimality of α∗i→j . Hence, ui(αi→j) <
ui(α
∗
i→j).
By fully considering the two cases, we conclude that the optimal equal-reciprocal scheme also
(locally) maximizes the local utility of each individual.
Remark 19. To motivate social grouping with the optimal equal-reciprocal incentive benefits
not only the BS (i.e., reduce the completion time), but also users (i.e., save cost). The optimal
incentive scheme is a win-win strategy. In particular, the optimal equal-reciprocal scheme provide
two incentives for users: (1) fairness from the equal-reciprocal constraint, and (2) local utility
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maximization.
Example 20. We now further analyze the large symmetric network scenario in Subsection II-B.
Let D be the expected amount of content downloaded by a user from the social group, then
D = pe(1− p
N−1
e ),
where the first term indicates a packet loss from the BS, while the second term is the probability
that at least one other user has got the packet. Moreover, let U be the expected amount of content
uploaded by a user in the social group, then based on the sharing probability of Eq. (3), we get
U = (1− pe) ·
N−1∑
i=0
(
N − 1
i
)
(1− pe)
ipN−1−ie ·
1
i+ 1
,
where the first term implies that the user has successfully received the packet, and the variable i
is the number of the other users that have got the packet yet; precisely, 1/(i+1) is the probability
that the user is selected to share the content.
In Fig. 14, we show the ratio of D/U , which indicates that a user can be rewarded with more
packets from the social group than the contribution as long as the number of users is not trivial.
With the aid of the incentivized social group, a user can save cost by downloading content from
the social group while only upload a smaller amount of content in return. Finally, we remark
that using the tit-for-tat incentive, the ratio is one. ◭
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we consider a practical MicroCast network scenario and propose the equal-
reciprocal incentive scheme to motivate social grouping. We theoretically investigate the optimal
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equal-reciprocal scheme, and show that the optimal equal-reciprocal mechanism is a win-win
policy that improves the performance of both BSs and local users. Finally, we propose on-
line scheduling algorithms that dynamically select a user to share content. We conclude that the
network performance can be upgraded using the proposed social grouping and on-line algorithms.
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APPENDIX A
B2D BROADCAST BY EXPLOITING THE COMMON INTEREST
Though traditionally the users communicate with the BS via their cellular links independently,
one of the users in a group can initiate a streaming session; then, the BS will identify the common
interest and deliver the common interest over the broadcast B2D; moreover, a new user can join
existing streams. These functions have been implemented in the MicroDownload system [3–5],
which is a component of the MicroCast system. We now analyze the benefit from the common
interest in the time-varying ON/OFF network.
Let T6= be the completion time if the BS uses the traditional unicast to deliver q to c1, c2 (i.e.,
without identifying the common interest). We notice that T6= < 2/(1− pe) as the BS knows the
channel state vector in advance and hence can schedule a packet to transmit if the associated
channel is ON. Then, we express T6= as follows.
T6= = p
2
e(1 + T6=) + (1− p
2
e)(1 +
1
1− pe
) (12)
=
pe + 2
1− p2e
,
where the first term in RHS of Eq. (12) indicates that both channels are OFF and the first B2D
transmission takes one time slot, while the second term means that one of the packets q1 and q2
has been successfully delivered and the other has not yet; hence, it takes the expected time of
1/(1− pe) to deliver the other packet.
Hence, the improvement from identifying the common interest (see Eq. (1)) is
R6=/= :=
T6=
T=
=
pe + 2
2pe + 1
.
APPENDIX B
TO INCENTIVIZE A USER OR NOT
As a user with a poor B2D channel reduces sharing content, when there is a new coming user,
is it the best choice to motivate the user to join in the social group, or is it better to serve the
user only by the BS? We remind that users of a social group would exchange a key before any
content transfer; as such, users outside the social group cannot decode received packets from
the social group.
First, we analyze three asymmetric users c1, c2, and c3 like Subsection III-B, while (c1, c2)
is an existing social group and c3 is a new user, where pe,1, pe,2, pe,3 are the channel error
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probabilities, respectively. Via the simplified case, we get more insight; a general case will be
discussed later.
We consider two possible groupings G1 = ((c1, c2), (c3)) and G2 = (c1, c2, c3). If c3 is not
motivated to participate in the existing group, the BS needs to transmit the packet to c3. Let T ∗G1
and T ∗G2 be the minimum completion times to deliver the common interest to c1, c2, c3 with the
grouping G1 and G2, respectively. We note that T ∗G2 is calculated in Subsection III-B.
First, we consider that pe,3 ≥ max(pe,1, pe,2). There will be a trade-off according to two cases:
• Increase of user diversity: As the benefit to exploit user diversity increases (i.e., there users
c1, c2, and c3 in G2 can help each other but only c1 and c2 help each other in G1), the
optimal completion time T ∗G2 might be shorter than T
∗
G1
;
• Decrease of sharing probability: Similar to Section III, adding a worse user c3 to the existing
group reduces the sharing probabilities between c1 and c2 because of the equal-reciprocal
constraint.
In other words, adding c3 to the existing social group increases the user diversity, while reducing
the sharing probability. The trade-off between the user diversity and the sharing probability leads
to a question: should c3 be grouped?
Second, we notice that if pe,3 < max(pe,1, pe,2), then G2 is better because adding c3 to the
existing social group increases both the user diversity and the sharing probabilities. Therefore,
we focus on pe,1 ≤ pe,2 ≤ pe,3.
Similar to Subsection III-B and Theorem 7, we can calculate the ratio T ∗G1/T
∗
G2
, which is
larger than one as shown in Fig. 15. From the numerical results, we find incentivizing the new
coming c3 minimizes the completion time.
While a more rigorous proof will be in the next subsection, we are discussing an intuition here.
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Because pe,3 ≥ max(pe,1, pe,2), the time when c3 receives the content dominates the completion
time even though the sharing probabilities between c1 and c2 decrease when including c3.
Moreover, since c1 and c2 share content with c3 in G2, the user c3 in G2 will get the packet
earlier. In other words, G2 minimizes the completion time.
A. Large asymmetric networks
We now consider a general case where there exists a social group (c1, · · · , cN) and a new user
cN+1. Let pe,i, 1 ≤ i ≤ N + 1, be their channel error probabilities, respectively. Without loss
of generality, we assume that pe,1 ≤ · · · ≤ pe,N+1. Similarly, we denote two groupings G1 =
((c1, · · · , cN), cN+1) and G2 = (c1, · · · , cN+1). We start with a theorem regarding pe,N+1 ≥ 0.5
as below.
Theorem 21. If pe,N+1 ≥ 0.5, to group cN+1 minimizes the completion time, i.e., to group all is
the best.
Proof: We consider an auxiliary group Gˆ = (cˆ1, · · · , cˆN+1), with the error probabilities of
each user cˆi, i = 1, · · · , N +1, being pe,N+1. Let T ∗Gˆ be the corresponding minimum completion
time, and TcN+1 be the expected time when cN+1 successfully receives the packet from the BS
when G1 is applied. Then, we have
T ∗G1 ≥TcN+1 (13)
≥T ∗
Gˆ
(14)
≥T ∗G2 , (15)
where Eq. (13) is because cN+1 should be satisfied; Eq. (14) is according to Lemma 5; Eq. (15)
is because all nodes in Gˆ have the worse channels than those in G2.
We remind that the reason why G1 is better than G2 is that including a user cN+1 with a
worse channel reduces the sharing probabilities between c1, · · · , cN . Moreover, in group G2 the
sharing probabilities increase when pe,N+1 decreases, while in group G1 the sharing probabilities
is the same for all pe,N+1 value. Hence, when pe,N+1 < 0.5, the grouping G2 is better than G1
as the sharing probabilities is larger than the case of pe,N+1 = 0.5, in which G2 is better. We
therefore can conclude the optimality of grouping all as follows.
Theorem 22. To incentivize a new coming users minimizes the completion time, no matter what
the distribution of B2D channel errors is.
